Each of two experts may provide service for a client. In one state, one expert has a lower service cost than the other expert; in another state, the opposite is true. Each expert may also exert e¤ort to acquire information about a client's service cost. E¤ort and acquired signal are private information. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts e¤ort and refers successfully, yet e¤ort and referral are ine¢ cient. If experts form an organization, they can transfer costs among themselves. Within such an organization, an expert who refers bears the service cost incurred by the referred expert. Referral e¢ ciency can be restored at the expense of cost-reduction incentives. An organization has a lower expected cost if and only if referral e¢ ciency is more important than cost incentives.
Introduction
We study an economic system consisting of experts who provide services to clients. An expert may invest in e¤ort to …nd out a client's state-contingent service costs, as well as to reduce overall costs. We consider e¢ ciencies in a referral market and within an expert organization that can assign cost responsibilities. For each institution, we study an expert's information-acquisition and cost-reduction incentives, and experts'incentives to refer clients to each other.
Information acquisition and task assignment are topical in policy forums. In the U.S. healthcare reform, cost-control measures are being phased in after the A¤ordable Care Act took e¤ect in 2014. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the federal agency that administers the insurance programs for the elderly and the indigent, has been encouraging providers (such as general practitioners, specialists, and hospitals) to form so-called Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). 1 Such organizations are supposed to reduce cost through better care coordination achieved by referrals among physicians (see Song, Sequist, and Barnett (2014) ). Other professionals, such as accountants and lawyers, refer clients to each other, whether they operate in the market or within an organization. How do experts'performances compare in the market and within an organization?
We provide a framework for these comparisons.
In our model, each of a set of clients would like to obtain service from one of two experts. A client's case can be easy or complicated. An easy case is always less expensive to service than a complicated one. However, the two experts have di¤erent cost comparative advantages: Expert 1 has a lower service cost than Expert 2 if the case is easy; conversely, Expert 2 incurs a lower cost than Expert 1 if the case is complicated. The complexity of a client's case is unknown. An expert may exert some e¤ort to obtain information about the case. The e¤ort generates an informative signal, and, as a convention, a higher signal indicates a higher likelihood of a complicated case, so a higher (expected) cost. The service from an expert gives a …xed bene…t to a client, and each client pays a …xed tari¤ for the service. 2 We …rst study how experts operate in a referral market. After, say, Expert 1 has exerted an e¤ort and observed a signal, he may make a referral o¤er to Expert 2: the client and the service tari¤ are transferred from Expert 1 to Expert 2 if Expert 2 pays a referral price. The problems facing these experts are: i) e¤ort is hidden action, unknown to anyone except the expert who exerts it, and ii) the signal generated by e¤ort is hidden information, unknown to anyone except the expert who has exerted the e¤ort.
Despite asymmetric-information problems, there is an equilibrium in which Expert 1 exerts e¤ort, and successfully refers clients to Expert 2 if and only if their signal is above a threshold (a higher signal indicating a higher expected cost). An expert's incentive is to avoid complicated and costly clients, so in equilibrium Expert 2 only gets lemons from Expert 1. However, Expert 2 has a cost advantage in complicated cases. Expert 1 credibly exploits this cost advantage when setting the referral price, so the referred lemons will be accepted.
Expert 2's acceptance decision is based on comparing the referral price with the average cost given that signals are above the threshold. For e¢ ciency, Expert 2 should have compared the referral price with the actual expected cost, but this is Expert 1's private information. This discrepancy is common in adverse-selection models. As a result, Expert 1's referral and information-acquisition decisions do not internalize all cost savings due to cost comparative advantage, and are never …rst best.
Expert 2's equilibrium strategy, however, is completely di¤erent. He will neither exert e¤ort nor make any referral. The cost comparative advantage for Expert 1 is for the client with an easy case, but there is no equilibrium in which Expert 2 refers a client to Expert 1. A simple case is more pro…table than a complicated case. If in equilibrium Expert 2 was successful at referring a client at a signal, he would also refer the client if the signal had become higher (indicating a higher cost).
In other words, Expert 2 would always refer lemons, never peaches. Expert 2's referral, therefore, would not let Expert 1 exploit his cost comparative advantage. Without any success in referral in equilibrium, Expert 2 does not exert e¤ort.
We then study expert organizations. The referral market equilibrium is ine¢ cient because an expert is unconcerned about the cost consequence to be borne by the expert who accepts the referral.
Our premise is that an organization di¤ers from the market because it can make cost information available ex post. In an organization, when an expert refers a client, the referring expert can be held responsible for the cost incurred by the referred expert. We call this the cost-transfer protocol. An expert now can fully internalize bene…ts of cost comparative advantage. If Expert 1's signal indicates that Expert 2 has a lower expected cost, he simply refers the client to Expert 2 and, under the cost-transfer protocol, reaps the cost savings. (Song, Sequist, and Barnett (2014) identify an ACO exactly as an organization in which "physicians...share the consequences of each other's referral decisions".)
We also examine a drawback of the cost-transfer protocol. We enrich our model by allowing each expert to choose a cost-reduction e¤ort when serving a client. This adds another hidden action. When experts operate in the market, each is responsible for his cost, so cost e¤ort must be e¢ cient. Cost reduction is orthogonal to information acquisition and referral in the market. This is no longer true for an organization that uses the cost-transfer protocol.
Our point is that the cost-transfer protocol introduces a new tradeo¤. When experts can reduce their costs, the magnitude of cost saving determines whether a market performs better than an organization. If cost saving by e¤ort is small, cost comparative advantage dominates cost e¤ort, so an expert organization performs better than the market. If cost saving by e¤ort is large, the opposite is true. Ours is also a theory about whether referrals should be among experts within a …rm under the cost-transfer protocol, or among independent experts in the market.
We consider various extensions of the basic model. First, we discuss constraints on experts' capacities, and variable returns. We qualify how various results should be properly interpreted.
Second, we endogenize clients' tari¤s by a Bertrand game. Finally, we let cost comparative advantage potentially be big so that a client may be a lemon to one expert, but a peach to another.
There, we show that referrals by both experts may arise in equilibrium.
Our paper is related to the literatures on credence goods, referrals, and organizations. In contrast to models of credence goods (see the Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) survey), we simplify experts' price and treatment decisions. Here, an expert sets one price and has no control over costs. Furthermore, many models of credence goods are on interactions between experts and clients.
Instead, we study the interactions between experts via referral and information acquisition. Garicano and Santos (2004) study referrals between two experts who have di¤erent productivities and costs in generating revenue from a project by exerting e¤orts. An expert can choose between implementing a project himself, or referring it to the other expert. Referral of a project is subject to asymmetric information because a project's potential can be either high or low, which is privately known by an expert. Equilibrium referrals via …xed price or revenue-sharing contracts are often ine¢ cient. In our model, private information is in the form of a continuous signal, rather than a binary signal. The kinds of ine¢ ciency in our model are also di¤erent. First, experts'e¤orts to acquire information are ine¢ cient. Second, an expert's equilibrium referrals do not internalize social cost savings. Third, when experts form an organization, we allow the transfer of costs, which leads to shirking.
Referrals incentives have been studied in models of consumers searching for experts' advice; see Arbatskaya and Konishi (2012) , Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) , Ottaviani (2009), and Park (2005) . Experts face a tradeo¤ between honestly advising clients to build a good reputation, and reaping a quick pro…t at the client's expense. We do not model search or reputation here, but we show that even without threats from consumers, referrals may occur.
Referrals are studied in the health literature. In the health sector, insurers set up incentive mechanisms for referrals between providers, say, between general practitioners and specialists (see Shumsky and Pinker (2003) and Mariñoso and Jelovac (2003) ). We do not follow a contract-design approach but our result suggests that physician organizations may lead to e¢ cienct referrals. Also, market referrals with …nancial transfers are uncommon in the medical sector. However, our analysis of how an organization provides incentive to refer clients is relevant to the organizational approach currently advocated in the health domain. We will revisit this after we have presented results.
We contribute to organizational economics. Our hypothesis that costs become transferable when experts merge is similar to the reallocation of ownership rights within a …rm. Schmidt (1996) argues that the allocation of ownership rights has an important impact on the allocation of information about the …rm. Garicano (2000) , Garicano and Santos (2004) and Fuchs and Garicano (2010) argue that organizations can better match clients to experts, and this is supported by evidence of obstetric practices in Epstein, Ketcham, and Nicholson (2010) . We have argued that when cost comparative advantage is internalized, matches will be e¢ cient, so we explain why better matches happen.
However, we point out the degradation of work incentives when costs are transferred in an organization. This possibility has also been raised by Frandsen and Rebitzer (2015) , who show that free-riding problems in ACOs may erode savings from better care coordination. Cebul et al. (2008) and Rebitzer and Votruba (2011) provide evidence on the adverse e¤ects of coordination failures in the health care delivery system in the U.S. The free-riding and work-incentive de…ciency should be weighed against better referrals, which, according to Able (2013) , is the mechanism by which ACOs reduce aggregate medical expenditures and improve Medicare patient health.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and derive the …rst best.
Section 3 studies a market in which experts can refer clients to each other at a price. In Section 4, we present organizations and compare them to the market and the …rst best. We also provide speci…c perspectives on the relevance of our theory to legal and medical professionals. In Section 5 we consider a number of robustness issues. Section 6 concludes. An Appendix contains proofs of results.
The model 2.1 Clients and experts
Each of a set of clients needs the service from one of two experts. These clients may be consumers who seek services from professionals such as lawyers, doctors, or engineers. Alternatively, a company may have projects that require inputs from outside contractors, and these projects correspond to the clients while the contractors are the experts. We let there be a continuum of clients, with the total mass normalized at 1. Each client is characterized by a state or a type. Each client's state or type is independently and identically distributed on the binary support f! 1 ; ! 2 g with a probability 1=2 on each state. We discuss the equal prior assumption in Section 5.
There are two experts, namely Expert 1 and Expert 2. Each expert can provide a service to any number of clients. This amounts to an assumption that experts have enough capacities. We further assume that the cost of service (including e¤ort disutility, see below) is linear in the number of clients served. We do not aim to construct a theory on organizations and incentives based on returns to scale or …xed costs, so nonbinding capacity and constant returns are natural assumptions.
We assume that each expert gives the same bene…t to a client.
Experts di¤er by their service costs that are dependent on a client's states. The following table de…nes each expert's cost contingent on a client's type:
. If a client's state is ! 1 , Expert 1's service cost, c L , is lower than Expert 2's, c L + , but if a client's state is ! 2 , Expert 2's service cost is lower. (In Section 5 we consider an alternative cost con…guration:
The cost saving is assumed to be symmetric between the experts for convenience. Ex ante each expert has the same expected cost of providing services to clients. State ! 1 can be thought of as a "good" or "easy" state: the service cost is lower, either c L for Expert 1 or c L + for Expert 2. State ! 2 corresponds to a "bad" or "complicated" state with service cost either c H or c H .
Expert 1 has a cost advantage in state ! 1 , while Expert 2 has an advantage in state ! 2 .
The setup for experts'costs will be enriched in Section 4. Each expert's cost will be stochastic, and each expert can take an e¤ort to reduce the expected value of his cost distribution (so the costs de…ned above would be expected values). We will then use the more general setup to compare markets and organizations. Until then, we use the simpler setup above. Our de…nition of the …rst best, and our results in Section 3 are una¤ected by the omission of cost-reduction e¤orts.
We subscribe to the credence-good framework. Clients do not get to observe their states when they seek services from experts. Neither do clients get to observe how much cost an expert eventually incurs to provide the service. The only contractible event for clients is that the service is provided.
To a client, for a given tari¤ for service provided, the experts are identical because each of them provides the same bene…t.
Information acquisition
Experts do not observe clients'cost types. Each expert can acquire information about a client's cost type by exerting a costly e¤ort. We assume that each expert has the same information-acquisition technology and e¤ort disutility. The information comes in the form of a signal de…ned on a positive support, s 2 [s; s]. Let e 2 R + denote an expert's e¤ort, and (e) denote the disutility of e¤ort.
The disutility may have …xed and variable components. To acquire information, an expert has to set up an experiment, and exercise care during the investigation. These two steps correspond to the …xed and variable components. We assume that the …xed disutility is not so high as to make information acquisition worthless. On the other hand, we will assume that it is not so low that an expert will acquire information many times. That is, (0) > 0, but (0) is not too big. We assume that for any strictly positive e¤ort, is increasing and convex. We also let lim e!0 + = 0 (e) = 0, so that the disutility due to the variable component can be arbitrarily low.
Let f i (sje) be the density of the signal s conditional on e¤ort e and state ! i , i = 1; 2. We assume that both f 1 and f 2 are always strictly positive, and continuous. By Bayes rule, conditional on a signal s, the posterior probability of the state being ! i is Pr(! i js; e) = f i (sje) f 1 (sje) + f 2 (sje) ; i = 1; 2:
(1)
We assume that for any e¤ort, the signal satis…es Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP):
As a normalization, we let the signals be completely uninformative at the lowest e¤ort, e = 0, so that f 1 (sj0) = f 2 (sj0), each s 2 [s; s], and that for e > 0, the inequality in the MLRP de…nition holds as a strict inequality for each s. Under MLRP f 2 (sje) f 1 (sje) is increasing in s, so a higher value of the signal indicates a higher likelihood that the state is ! 2 :
Pr(! 2 js; e) = 1
is increasing in s.
For future use, we note that the ex ante density of signal s, given e¤ort e, is Pr(
A higher e¤ort makes signals more informative. We use the following assumption on how the densities f 1 and f 2 relate to e¤orts, and call it the Informativeness Property:
For e 0 > e, f 2 (sje 0 ) …rst-order stochastically dominates f 2 (sje), and f 1 (sje) …rst-order stochastically dominates f 1 (sje 0 ).
A higher e¤ort reduces the conditional cumulative density Z s s f 2 (xje)dx and raises the conditional cumulative density
First-order stochastic dominance is often used in the literature to de…ne how e¤ort a¤ects information. A higher e¤ort makes a lower signal more indicative of state ! 1 , while it makes a higher signal more indicative of state ! 2 . We further assume that both conditional densities are di¤erentiable in e.
First best
An allocation is an e¤ort to be taken by an expert, and a decision rule that assigns a client to an expert according to the generated signal. The …rst best is an allocation that minimizes experts' expected service cost and e¤ort disutilities. (In Subsection 4.1, we will extend the de…nition of an allocation and the …rst best to include a cost-reduction e¤ort.) In principle, an allocation can prescribe multiple e¤orts to generate multiple (informative) signals and an assignment rule based on all signals. Our assumption at the beginning of Subsection 2.2 rules this out, so e¤ort is to be exerted only once in the …rst best.
Let an expert take e¤ort e. Contingent on signal s, the expected cost of servicing this client by Experts 1 and 2 are, respectively,
Pr(! 1 js; e) (c L + ) + Pr(! 2 js; e) (c H ) :
The conditional probabilities are given by (1), so Expert 2 has a cost lower than Expert 1 if and
if and only if f 1 (sje) f 2 (sje). In this notation, the cost-minimizing allocation assigns a client to Expert 2 if and only if the client's signal s is larger than b s f b (e).
Given the cost-minimizing allocation, the total expected service cost and e¤ort disutility per client is We assume that (4) is quasi-convex. 3 The …rst-best e¤ort, e f b , is one that minimizes (4). The Convexity requires that the Hessian is positive de…nite.
…rst-order condition is:
The …rst best characterization has the following interpretations. First, the base costs, c L and c H , set up reference points only, so their values do not appear in the …rst-order condition (5).
Second, cost saving, from c H to c H may be achieved, and cost increase from c L to c L + may be avoided. The assignment of a client to Expert 2 whenever s is above a threshold is for cost e¤ectiveness. Third, a higher e¤ort yields more precise signals, but leads to more disutility. The left-hand side of (5) re ‡ects the bene…t. Because both f 1 and f 2 are densities, the integral in (5) would have been zero if the lower limit was set to s. Now by the Informativeness Property, this integral, with lower limit at b s f b (e f b ) > s must be strictly positive, and it measures how strongly higher values of s leads to cost-e¤ective assignments of clients. The right-hand side of (5) is the marginal disutility of e¤ort.
We assume that clients are matched randomly to experts, and pay a …xed tari¤, T , to the expert who renders a service. Each client obtains the same bene…t from an expert and each expert's ex ante cost for treating a random client is equal to the average cost. The only restriction here is that T is at least the ex ante average cost, (c L + c H )=2. In Subsection 5.1, we endogenize the tari¤ (and also the initial assignment of clients) by letting experts compete in a Bertrand fashion. Our results are unchanged with endogenously chosen tari¤s. 4
Referral market
We look for perfect-Bayesian equilibria of the following extensive form:
Stage 0: For each client, his cost type, either ! 1 or ! 2 , is drawn independently with equal probabilities. The draw is never observed by a client or an expert. Half of all clients are matched with Expert 1, and the other half with Expert 2.
Stage 1: An expert decides on an e¤ort for a matched client. Then the expert observes a realization of the signal for each exerted e¤ort. The e¤ort and signal are the expert's private information.
Stage 2: For each client an expert chooses between keeping the client and referring the client to the other expert at a price that he chooses.
Stage 3: If an expert has received a referral at some price, the expert decides whether to accept the referral or reject it. If the expert accepts the referral, he pays the other expert the referral price, provides service to the client, incurs the cost (as the client's state eventually realizes), and receives the tari¤. If he rejects the referral, the referring expert will render service and receive the tari¤.
In Stage 3, an expert may not acquire information before deciding between accepting and rejecting a referral. This may be due to an expert having no access to the client until he has accepted the referral. Alternatively, information acquisition may be time consuming, and delays may be unacceptable to clients. Finally, a model with multiple rounds of information acquisition together with o¤ers and countero¤ers, is less tractable, and outside the scope here.
An expert's payo¤ comes from one of three events. First, if an expert has kept his own client, he gets the tari¤, and incurs the service cost and e¤ort disutility. Second, if an expert has accepted a referral, he pays the referral price, keeps the tari¤, and incurs the service cost. Third, if an expert's referral has been accepted, he gets the referral price and incurs the e¤ort disutility. Each expert has a reservation utility that is set at 0. The referral price made by an expert can be positive or
negative.
An expert's strategy is de…ned by i) an e¤ort in Stage 1, ii) a referral decision and price in There are many unreached information sets. For example, in an equilibrium, Expert 1 may take some e¤ort e 1 , make a referral o¤er at price p 1 if and only if signal s is above a certain threshold. What would Expert 2 believe about Expert 1's e¤ort and signal if Expert 1's referral price were p 0 1 6 = p 1 ? Also, in an equilibrium, an expert may not make any referral at all, so all referral prices are o¤-equilibrium. Perfect-Bayesian equilibria do not impose belief restrictions at out-of-equilibrium information sets. Multiple equilibria can be supported by many o¤-path beliefs (and will be discussed later). We will impose a natural and simple belief restriction to be de…ned in Subsection 3.2.
In the following subsections, we construct an equilibrium with the following outcome: Expert 1 exerts a strictly positive e¤ort, but Expert 2 does not. Expert 1 refers at a price for all signals above a threshold. Expert 2 does not refer. We will begin the construction by presenting necessary conditions, then prove existence by a standard …xed-point argument.
Experts'equilibrium referral and acceptance strategies
Consider any equilibrium in which Expert 1 has taken an e¤ort, say e 1 > 0, and has observed a signal s in Stage 1. In a continuation equilibrium in Stage 2, if Expert 1 makes a referral that will be accepted, it will always be at a unique price. Indeed, If Expert 2 would accept at referral prices p 0 1 and p 1 , with p 1 < p 0 1 , then Expert 1 would never make a referral at the lower price p 1 . Hence, in equilibrium, Expert 2 must reject all o¤ers above a threshold, p 1 .
Suppose that Expert 2 accepts a referral at price p 1 . How should Expert 1 choose between keeping and referring the client? Given that Expert 1 has taken e¤ort e 1 and observed signal s, the expected payo¤ (net from e¤ort disutility) from keeping the client is T Pr(! 1 js; e 1 )c L Pr(! 2 js; e 1 )c H :
Because this is decreasing in s by MLRP, we conclude that Expert 1 will refer the client with signal
Clearly, we can repeat the same steps for Expert 2's referral decision given that Expert 1 accepts a referral if the price is below a threshold. We summarize the result in the following lemma, whose proof is already in the text above.
Lemma 1 In an equilibrium, in Stage 3 an expert's referral is accepted if and only if the referral price is at or below a threshold, and in Stage 2, an expert makes a referral if and only if the signal exceeds a threshold.
Lemma 1 asserts that, in any equilibrium in which e¤ort is positive, referral decisions and acceptance decisions must be threshold policies. Transmission of the private signal from informationacquisition e¤ort must be pooling. Furthermore, an expert will refer lemons and keep peaches.
Expert 1' s equilibrium referral and e¤ort
We now focus on Expert 1's referral under the assumption that he has taken an e¤ort. First, we introduce a belief restriction:
De…nition 1 (Passive Belief ) A perfect-Bayesian equilibrium is said to satisfy passive belief if an expert's belief about the hidden e¤ ort and signal on any o¤ -equilibrium referral price remains the same as the belief at the equilibrium price.
Passive belief was …rst introduced by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) in the context of multilateral contracts. 5 Here, it says that deviations are uncorrelated trembles. Suppose that, in an equilibrium, Expert 1 takes e¤ort e 1 , and makes a referral o¤er at price p 1 if and only if s is above a certain threshold. If Expert 2 receives a referral price p 0 1 6 = p 1 , passive belief speci…es that Expert 2 continues to believe that Expert 1 has taken e¤ort e 1 and has made a referral because the signal is above s. The restriction requires Expert 2 to believe that his expected cost remains at the same equilibrium level even when Expert 1 o¤ers an o¤-equilibrium referral price.
Lemma 2 Under passive belief, in an equilibrium in which Expert 1 takes e¤ ort e 1 and refers whenever s > b s, Expert 1's equilibrium referral price p 1 must be :
so Expert 2's equilibrium expected utility must equal the outside option.
The proof of Lemma 2 is this. When Expert 2 receives a referral, according to passive belief, he must believe that Expert 1's signal is above b s. Expert 2's expected cost of providing service to the
Given this best response by Expert 2, Expert 1 optimally chooses the highest price that will be accepted. This is the de…nition of p 1 in (8). Clearly, Expert 2 earns a zero expected utility when he accepts a referral. (The equilibrium referral price may be negative; Expert 1 may have to pay Expert 2 in order to cover the expected cost because the tari¤ is low. For example, if T is just equal to the average of c L and c H , then T cannot cover Expert 2's expected cost, but Expert 1 will set p 1 to be negative to cover that loss. Expert 1 will do this because his loss without a referral would be even higher.)
Passive belief does rule out many other equilibria. In these equilibria, Expert 2 earns strictly more than the outside option, but referral happens less often. To see this, choose " > 0, and for the same e¤ort e 1 and some signal threshold b s 0 consider a referral price p 0 1 satisfying
Now Expert 2's strategy is to accept a referral at price p 0 or lower. Expert 2 believes that the signal is at least b s 0 . If Expert 1 o¤ers p 1 > p 0 1 , Expert 2 would change his belief; he now believes that the signal threshold has increased from b s 0 (perhaps all the way to s). Now that the bad state is thought to be more likely, Expert 2's expected cost has increased, so he rejects p 1 . Expert 1 is then stuck with having to refer at a price that leaves some rent. Passive belief rules out such a discontinuous change: when a referral is made at a higher price, Expert 2 must continue to believe that the referral threshold is b s 0 . (See also the discussion following Proposition 1.) From now on, we will always use passive belief.
We continue to characterize Expert 1's referral threshold b s. (The proof is in the Appendix.)
Lemma 3 For e 1 > 0, the equation
has a unique solution s b s s.
Suppose that Expert 1 has chosen e¤ort e 1 . If he observes signal s, his expected cost of providing service is (9), whereas if Expert 2 gets all the clients with signals above s, Expert 2's expected cost is (10). Lemma 3 says that there must be a signal b s for which these two expected costs are equal. 6
This result stems from Expert 2's comparative advantage in providing services to clients at state 6 If e¤ort has not been exerted, then f 1 = f 2 , and the signal is uninformative. The only solution for the equation is s. For any strictly positive e¤ort e 1 , the solution is strictly interior. is Expert 1's expected cost at signal s (9). The dotted line is Expert 1's expected cost given that signals are above s:
This dotted line is always above Expert 1's expected cost at signal s. By MLRP, a higher s means that state ! 2 is more likely. The expected cost conditional on all signals above s must indicate a higher expected cost than at signal s. This expected cost, conditional on signals above s, of course converges to (9) at s = s.
Now Expert 2's comparative advantage makes his expected cost, expression (10) and the dashed line in Figure 1 , less than (11) at high values of s. (Expression (11) is identical to expression (10) at = 0.) But this comparative advantage diminishes as the conditional threshold s drops towards s.
If Expert 2 cannot exclude any possible signal Expert 1 has observed, his expected cost is simply
s is the intersection of the solid and dashed lines.
The signi…cance of Lemma 3 is this. Although Expert 1's referrals pool all clients with signals higher than b s, the experts nevertheless can mutually bene…t from trade due to Expert 2's cost comparative advantage at state ! 2 . Expert 1's referrals are all lemons, but Expert 2's has lower expected cost servicing lemons. Given e¤ort e 1 , as long as the signal is above b s, the one in Lemma 3, a successful referral happens in equilibrium, as the next result shows (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium in which Expert 1 exerts strictly positive e¤ ort e 1 , he refers a client with a signal s b s to Expert 2 at a price p 1 , and Expert 2 accepts a referral if and only if
In (12) 
Here, Expert 1's referral price is p 0 1 , and Expert 2's equilibrium payo¤ is at " > 0. If Expert 1 raised the price from p 0 1 to extract more rent, Expert 2 now would believe that the client had a very high signal, say s, and would reject the higher price. This continuation equilibrium is consistent with Lemma 1, but violates passive belief. Under passive belief, any price between p 0 1 and p 0 1 + " must be accepted by Expert 2. For e¤ort e 1 , the continuation equilibrium in Proposition 1 has the most referrals.
We next study Expert 1's e¤ort incentive. If e 1 is an equilibrium e¤ort, given that Expert 2 will accept a referral at price p 1 , Expert 1's referral threshold is in (7). Recalling that the ex ante density of s is 0:5[f 1 (sje 1 ) + f 2 (sje 1 )], we write Expert 1's expected payo¤ per client as
From the de…nition of b s in (7), the …rst integral above is Expert 1's expected utility when he keeps the client (s below b s), while the second is the expected utility when he successfully refers (s above b s). Using the expressions for the conditional probabilities of the states ! 1 and ! 2 , we simplify the payo¤ per client to
The …rst term in (13) is the expected payo¤ from treating a randomly chosen client; e¤ort has a cost, the second term, but generates an expected bene…t, the di¤erence between the referral price p 1 and what Expert 1 would have obtained if he had kept the client (the integral).
In an equilibrium in which Expert 1's e¤ort is positive, his equilibrium e¤ort e 1 and the referral threshold b s maximize (13) subject to the de…nition of b s in (7). The …rst-order condition characterizes Expert 1's equilibrium e¤ort: 7
A higher e¤ort raises the density f 2 more than the density f 1 at high signals s by the Informativeness
Also because c H > c L , for any p 1 between T c H and T c L , the term inside the curly brackets in (14) must be strictly positive.
Expert 2' s equilibrium e¤ort
We now turn to Expert 2's equilibrium e¤ort and referrals. Indeed, one might have thought that some "symmetry" might apply so Expert 2 could exploit cost comparative advantage. The answer is negative, as stated in the next Proposition (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium Expert 2 does not exert any e¤ ort or make any referral.
Expert 1 has cost comparative advantage in the good state ! 1 , so if there was any referral to exploit that advantage, Expert 2 would have to refer clients with low signals. Lemma 1, however, says that an expert would like to keep only clients with low signals; an expert will never refer peaches, only lemons. If Expert 1 believed that Expert 2 was referring clients with low signals, Expert 2 would cheat and refer clients with high signals. However, for clients with signals above a threshold Expert 1's expected costs will never be lower than Expert 2's. There is no possibility of mutually bene…cial trade. Given that in equilibrium Expert 2 does not refer, there is no incentive for him to acquire information.
Because Expert 2 does not make any equilibrium referral, all referral price o¤ers to Expert 1 are o¤-equilibrium, so passive belief has no bite. For later use, we note that the highest posterior belief on the bad state ! 2 can be written as Pr(! 2 js; e e) where e e = argmax e f 2 (sje)=f 1 (sje). We say that an expert has the most pessimistic belief if he believes that the other expert has taken e¤ort e e and has observed the signal s.
Equilibrium information acquisition and referral
Now we put together our earlier results and state the following (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 3 There is an equilibrium characterized by the triple [e 1 ; b s ; p 1 ] such that i) (e 1 ; b s ) maximize (13) given p 1 , and ii) p 1 is given by (12) at b s and e 1 . The equilibrium strategies and beliefs are: 1) Expert 1 chooses e¤ ort e 1 and refers a client with any signal s > b s at price p 1 and keeps other clients.
2) Expert 2 chooses zero e¤ ort, does not refer, and accepts a referral if and only if the referral price is at most p 1 .
3) If Expert 2 receives a referral at a price di¤ erent from p 1 , he continues to believe that Expert 1 has chosen e¤ ort e 1 and referred a client with signal s > b s .
4)
If Expert 1 receives a referral o¤ er from Expert 2 at any price, Expert 1 has the most pessimistic belief (he believes that Expert 2's e¤ ort is e e and his signal is s, where e e = argmax e f 2 (sje)=f 1 (sje)).
In Proposition 3, the …rst three points in the strategy and belief description follow directly from the previous two subsections. The fourth point is about Expert 1's response against o¤-equilibrium referral prices. We specify that Expert 1 has the most pessimistic belief. This is necessary to deter Expert 2 from deviating to a positive e¤ort, and referring a client when the signal indicates an expected loss. If Expert 1 believes that Expert 2 has taken no e¤ort, he will accept any o¤er p when T (c L + c H )=2 p 0. Now if Expert 2 chooses e¤ort e 2 > 0, and he observes an s where his expected cost is higher than the ex ante cost: Pr(! 1 js; e 2 )(c L + ) + Pr(! 2 js; e 2 )(c H ) > (c L + c H )=2, Expert 2 will pro…t by successfully referring at p = T (c L + c H )=2. Of course, this is inconsistent with Proposition 2, so Expert 1 believing Expert 2 having taken zero e¤ort cannot be part of o¤-equilibrium belief. To support the equilibrium, we have chosen the most pessimistic o¤-equilibrium belief when no price is ever o¤ered in equilibrium, and show in the proof that Expert 2 has no pro…table deviation from zero e¤ort. The …nal step in the proof is a standard, …xed-point argument for the existence of [e 1 ; b s ; p 1 ].
Expert 2 does not exert any e¤ort, which, of course, is ine¢ cient. What about Expert 1's equilibrium e¤ort and referrals? Using Proposition 1, and the …rst-order condition for Expert 1's equilibrium e¤ort, we write down the conditions for the referral equilibrium [e 1 ; b s ; p 1 ]:
Proposition 4 In an equilibrium, Expert 1's e¤ ort and referral threshold cannot be …rst best.
Furthermore, given equilibrium e¤ ort e 1 , Expert 1's referral threshold b s is too high, f 2 (b s je 1 ) > f 1 (b s je 1 ), so Expert 1 sometimes keeps a client even when his expected service cost is higher than What about Expert 1's equilibrium e¤ort? Using (15), we rewrite (16) as
The left-hand side of this expression is the marginal bene…t of e¤ort. We already have noted that c H c L > 2 , so that compared to the …rst best, the cost di¤erential c H c L a¤ects the marginal bene…t more strongly than the cost saving . However, we have b s strictly higher than the value at the cost-e¤ective threshold (where f 2 (sje 1 ) = f 1 (sje 1 )), so the integral is smaller. Moreover, the weight on the partial derivative @f 2 =@e 1 is smaller than 1, while the weight on @f 1 =@e 1 is larger than 1. These two e¤ects reduce the marginal bene…t. In sum, the equilibrium e¤ort may be smaller or larger than the …rst best. 8
Finally, we remark that the characterization of the referral equilibrium in (15) and (16) does not prove uniqueness. Although examples that we have constructed so far have all produced a unique equilibrium, we have not proven it. Formally, Lemma 3 does show that for any given e¤ort, (15) admits a unique solution for the price and referral threshold. It remains possible, however, that (16) admits multiple solutions in e¤ort. However, our characterization applies to every equilibrium.
Organizations
Equilibria in the referral market are ine¢ cient. An expert organization can perform better. As we have hypothesized in the Introduction, the key di¤erence between an open market and an organization is that service costs ex post become veri…able within an organization. The reassignment of cost responsibiity is possible. We present a de…nition:
De…nition 2 (Cost-transfer Protocol) Referrals are said to follow the cost-transfer protocol when the referring expert bears the client's cost when service is provided by the referred expert.
The cost-transfer protocol allows an organization to solve the adverse selection problem by transferring costs between experts. When an expert within an organization refers a client to a fellow expert, he is to be held responsible for the costs to be incurred by the referred expert. In other words, an expert fully internalizes the cost consequence of referring the client to another expert.
Using the cost-transfer protocol, many organizations, such as integration and partnership, can achieve the …rst best. Expert 1 buys out Expert 2, becomes the owner, performs all information acquisition, and refers clients whose signals indicate a higher likelihood of the bad state. Expert 2 becomes an employee, and any cost incurred will be the …rm's responsibility. Obviously, Expert 2 buying out Expert 1 achieves the same. Alternatively, the experts can form a partnership. Here, each expert will acquire information, and refers e¢ ciently. The partnership contract speci…es that an expert making a referral fully reimburses the service expense.
The (simplistic) solution relies on an expert does nothing other than providing service at a predetermined set of costs. We now consider a richer environment in which an expert's service includes an additional input: he also supplies an e¤ort that may reduce costs. Cost responsibility implies an incentive of cost reduction. But the cost-transfer protocol in organizations such as integration and partnership will mute this incentive. We will demonstrate a tradeo¤ between referral e¢ ciency and cost e¢ ciency, but …rst we extend the basic model to include cost reduction.
Cost-reduction e¤ort
We enrich the model in Subsection 2.1 with general cost reduction. First, a client's service cost is now randomly distributed on a positive support [c; c]. Next, each expert has a second hidden action: a cost-reduction e¤ort r 0 (besides the information-acquisition e¤ort The cost e¤ort and its disutility have the usual interpretation: task management, work hours, attention, etc. The last assumptions of the Inada sort ensure that cost comparative advantage is always valid because expected cost reduction never exceeds . The cost e¤ort is to be taken when an expert provides service. We de…ne the e¢ cient cost e¤ort by r argmax r [r (r)], and the …rst-best net cost reduction r (r ).
Cost-reduction and information-acquisition e¤orts are orthogonal in the …rst best and in the market. When each expert is fully responsible for service cost, he chooses e¤ort r which results in the cost saving . In the …rst best and the market-referral model, both experts take cost e¤ort r , so we simply rede…ne c L , c L + , c H , and c H by lowering each by . The …rst best and equilibria now refer to these rede…ned values. Characterizations of equilibrium information e¤ort and referral remain the same. More important, equilibria derived in the previous section do not depend on cost saving, . 10
Tradeo¤ in an organization: cost comparative advantage versus cost e¤ort
In the enriched model, we use the full-support cost distribution assumption. Contracts for the e¢ cient cost e¤ort by exploiting shifting cost-distribution supports are infeasible. An expert takes e¤ort r if and only if he is fully responsible for costs. In principle, organizations can employ partial cost-sharing contracts (the referring expert, for example, being responsible for 50% of cost) so that e¤orts between 0 and r can be implemented. For brevity, we do not consider partial cost-sharing contracts because they would not change economic principles. In other words, we continue to adopt the cost-transfer protocol: all service costs are to be borne by the referring expert.
The cost-transfer protocol, de…ned above, eliminates adverse selection, but it also eliminates the cost e¤ort. The referred expert will not take e¤ort to realize the net cost saving . This is the main tradeo¤. Now we adopt the accounting convention that the tari¤ stays with the expert who initiates the referral, so under cost-transfer protocol all referrals will be accepted with a zero price.
We continue with the assumption that half of all clients are matched with one expert-although the two experts operate within an organization. Consider Expert 1, and suppose that he has taken information-acquisition e¤ort e 1 , and receives a signal s on a client. His own expected service cost is Pr(! 1 js; e 1 )(c L )+Pr(! 2 js; e 1 )(c H ) because he chooses cost e¤ort r . Upon a referral, Expert 2 is not responsible for service cost, so he takes zero cost e¤ort. From Expert 1's perspective, if the client is referred to Expert 2, Expert 1 pays a service cost Pr(! 1 js; e 1 )(c L + ) Pr(! 2 js; e 1 )(c H ).
Clearly, Expert 1 refers the client if and only if doing so saves cost or if signal s is larger than e s 1 de…ned by f 1 (e s 1 je 1 )(c L ) + f 2 (e s 1 je 1 )(c H ) = f 1 (e s 1 je 1 )(c L + ) + f 2 (e s 1 je 1 )(c H ):
Simplifying (18), we obtain the following (proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 4 At e¤ ort e 1 , Expert 1 refers a client to Expert 2 if and only if signal s is higher than e s 1 , where f 1 (e s 1 je 1 ) f 2 (e s 1 je 1 ) = + 1:
The threshold e s 1 is …rst best at = 0, and increases to s as increases to .
Expert 1 will take cost e¤ort r for his clients to lower his expected cost by , but under the cost-transfer protocol, Expert 2 will not. If a signal indicates that Expert 2's expected cost is lower, it must be because the bad state is much more likely than 1=2. Furthermore, as the net saving from cost e¤ort increases, cost comparative advantage becomes less important, so referrals become less likely.
From Lemma 4, Expert 1's total expected cost from e¤ort e 1 is 0:5
Expert 1's payo¤ is not aligned with the social return to information-acquisition e¤ort. In the …rst best, Expert 2 chooses cost e¤ort r , but, in an organization, Expert 2 chooses zero cost e¤ort. We present (proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 5 Expert 1 does not choose the …rst-best information-acquisition e¤ ort in the cost-transfer protocol except at = 0. As increases to , Expert 1's information-acquisition e¤ ort decreases to 0.
Information-acquisition e¤ort is bene…cial only if it leads to referrals. When cost e¤ort is ine¤ective ( = 0), Expert 1 chooses the …rst-best information e¤ort because he internalizes cost comparative advantage. As increases, cost reduction becomes more important, and Expert 1's ex ante expected cost becomes lower, so he refers less often. In the limit when = , Expert 1 does not acquire information.
Lemmas 4 and 5 hold in a symmetric fashion for Expert 2. We now state these results (but omit their proofs).
Lemma 6 At e¤ ort e 2 , Expert 2 refers a client to Expert 1 if and only if signal s is lower than e s 2 , where f 1 (e s 2 je 2 ) f 2 (e s 2 je 2 ) = + 1:
The threshold e s 2 is …rst best at = 0, and decreases to s as increases to .
Analogous to (20), Expert 2's expected cost from e¤ort e 2 is 0:5
Lemma 7 Expert 2 does not choose the …rst-best information-acquisition e¤ ort in the cost-transfer protocol except at = 0. As increases to , Expert 2's information-acquisition e¤ ort decreases to 0.
Comparison between organization and market
Let e e 1 and e e 2 be Expert 1's and Expert 2's information e¤orts in the cost-transfer protocol. Expert 1 provides service to clients with signals below e s 1 , and refers those with signals above. Expert 2 provides service to clients with signals above e s 2 , and refers those with signals below. Referrals are always accepted, but the expert who receives a referral will take zero cost e¤ort. The total equilibrium expected costs per client is These four integrals correspond to di¤erent cases of experts retaining and referring clients. We simplify the expected cost per client in the cost-transfer protocol to
+0:5[ (e e 1 ) + (e e 2 )] EC t ( ):
Next, consider a market equilibrium. 11 Recall from Subsection 3.4 that the equilibrium allocation is given by Expert 1's e¤ort e 1 and referral threshold b s , and Expert 2's zero e¤ort and lack of referral. Each expert uses the …rst-best cost e¤ort for a net cost reduction. The total expected cost per client in the equilibrium is
Here, each expert takes cost e¤ort, so the net cost saving applies to each client. Expert 1 takes equilibrium e¤ort e 1 , and obtains a signal. The …rst integral is the expected cost of Expert 1's clients with signals below the equilibrium threshold b s , and the second integral is the expected cost of Expert 1's referred clients. Expert 2 neither takes e¤ort nor refers in equilibrium, so his expected cost is one half of the sum of c L and c H . We simplify the total equilibrium expected cost in the market equilibrium to
11 If there are many equilibria, pick any one for the comparison to follow.
Finally, from Subsection 2.3, we subtract from (4) evaluated at the …rst-best e¤ort to obtain the expected cost under the …rst best, and we call this EC f b ( ). The following presents the tradeo¤ between the market and the expert organization under cost-transfer protocol (the proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 5 The expected cost per client is lower under cost-transfer protocol than in a market equilibrium if and only if the net cost saving is below a threshold b , 0 < b < .
When net cost saving vanishes, the cost-transfer protocol achieves the …rst best. At = 0, we have EC t ( ) = EC f b ( ). The market equilibrium never achieves the …rst best. However, the market equilibrium always achieves cost saving because each expert bears his own costs. As increases from 0, expected costs in the …rst best, market, and cost-transfer protocol fall. Both EC f b ( ) and EC m ( ) fall at a unit rate as increases. What about the expected cost EC t ( )? As increases, referrals become less often under cost-transfer protocol, and information e¤ort becomes less important (see the last four lemmas). As a result, EC t ( ) falls at a rate less than 1 as increases. Beyond a critical value, expected cost of the market equilibrium becomes lower than cost-transfer protocol. The critical value b is obtained by the solution of EC m (b ) = EC t (b ).
We illustrate the three expected costs EC m ( ) and EC t ( ) and EC f b ( ) in the following Figure   2 . The …rst-best cost EC f b ( ) is a parallel downward shift of the cost in the market EC m ( ). The cost EC t ( ) in the expert organization is at the …rst-best level at = 0, but decreases less steeply than the other two.
The basic economics principle is this. In the market, experts work hard to reduce their own costs, but an expert acquires private information, so referrals are subject to adverse selection.
In an organization, an expert works hard only if he is responsible for the cost, but cost-transfer protocol avoids asymmetric information. According to Proposition 5, transfer-cost protocol in an organization performs better than the market if and only if cost comparative advantage is more important than cost saving. 
Perspectives on legal and medical organizations
Our theory o¤ers a new perspective-tradeo¤ between adverse selection in the market and shirking within an organization. Proposition 5 predicts that experts form professional organizations when the cost comparative advantage from referrals is important, but that experts operate as solopractitioners when work e¤ort is more important. Using U.S. census data, Garicano and Hubbard (2009) show that lawyers form partnerships when they consult for corporations in markets such as banking, environment, and real estate developments. Our theory provides the foundation for the claim in Garicano and Hubbard (2009) . The complexity in commercial dealing likely calls for disparate knowledge, so cross-…eld referrals are critical. Lawyers in domestic, insurance, and criminal ligitations more likely work as independent practitioners. Noncommercial cases are more idiosyncratic, so a lawyer's own e¤ort is more critical.
Another illustration of our theory is in the malpratice-liability and personal litigations. According to Parikh (2006 Parikh ( /2007 , "top-end"lawyers in medical malpractice and product liability work in large practices, but "low-end"lawyers in automobile and "slip-and-fall"accidents work in solo practices. Our theory provides the rationale for the di¤erence in the work organization of these lawyers.
Top-end lawyers deal with more complex cases, so coordination between experts is important. By contrast, low-end lawyers may not have to rely on referrals that often.
Referral fees and fee-splitting are common among legal professionals, so our model applies straightforwardly. Nevertheless, our theory can also provide a normative view on the health care sector. In most countries, medical doctors are prohibited from obtaining …nancial bene…ts when they refer patients. The restriction is likely a safeguard against con ‡ict of interests. 12 In our model, referral is a …nancial transaction, so it is inconsistent with the current practice. However, within Accountable Care Organizations, which are promoted by the U.S. healthcare reform, cost consequences of referrals are internalized. Proposition 5 implies that when referrals with prices are disallowed, ACOs may achieve more cost savings when cost comparative advantage is important.
However, as Frandsen and Rebitzer (2015) point out, free-riding problems in ACOs can be severe, so cost comparative advantage must be balanced against muted work incentives in ACOs.
Robustness
We now discuss a number of robustness issues with the basic model of market referral. First, we assume only two states, ! 1 and ! 2 . This can be regarded as a normalization given that we consider only two experts. If there are many (even a continuum of) states, then we proceed by …rst de…ning the subset of states for which Expert 1 is less expensive than Expert 2, and then call that subset ! 1 . Second, we assume that the two states are equally likely. If they are not, the posterior probabilities in (1) will be modi…ed by prior probabilities attached to the conditional densities f 1 and f 2 . However, MLRP is una¤ected, and it remains valid that Expert 2's cost of providing service to a client is lower than Expert 1 if and only if the client's signal is higher than a threshold. Our computation is made easier by states being equally likely, but this assumption does not lead to any conceptual di¢ culties.
We have ignored capacities and variable returns. Here, there is another source of cost comparative advantage. The initial matching process may favor, say, Expert 1, who now has too many clients. Decreasing returns may lead him to refer some clients to Expert 2 even before he undertakes any e¤ort (so has received no signal). It is a complication that may interfere with the construction of Expert 2's equilibrium belief about the referred clients' states. An analysis will have to start with the initial match between clients and experts. However, we feel that this is beyond the scope of our current research.
Capacity and variable returns may also change the comparison between market and organization. Clearly, an organization is better able to enjoy economies of scale, manage capacities, or both.
The market is likely better modeled by a random initial match, but an organization can channel clients to its experts e¢ ciently. The details in Proposition 5 may have to be altered but the basic principle of tradeo¤ between adverse selection and cost-reduction incentive remains valid.
In the rest of this section, we discuss two issues in details. First, we endogenize the tari¤ T rather than take it as given. And second, we study the equilibrium of the referral game when the cost advantage is larger than the average cost, relaxing our assumption < (c L + c H )=2.
Equilibrium tari¤
We modify the referral market game in Section 3 to include a Bertrand-competition game. That is, in Stage 0, at the time when the clients'types are drawn, each expert announces a tari¤. Consumers observe these tari¤s, and choose an expert for service. A consumer promises to pay the required tari¤ to the chosen expert or to a referred expert, if any, when service is provided. 13
Recall that each expert can serve a client at an expected cost (c L + c H )=2. If an expert neither puts in e¤ort nor refers a client, his tari¤ cannot be lower than (c L +c H )=2. Indeed, we now construct an equilibrium in which both experts set tari¤s at (c L + c H )=2. Given this pair of (identical) tari¤s, the continuation equilibrium is the market equilibrium in Section 3. Expert 2 neither exerts e¤ort nor refers. When Expert 2 accepts a referral from Expert 1, his expected payo¤ is 0; see (12) in Proposition 1. Given Expert 1's tari¤ (c L + c H )=2, and the continuation equilibrium, it is optimal for Expert 2 to o¤er (c L + c H )=2:
Given that Expert 2 sets the tari¤ at (c L + c H )=2, Expert 1 will have no clients if he sets a higher tari¤. Now suppose Expert 1 undercuts Expert 2 slightly, o¤ering to provide service at a tari¤ just below (c L + c H )=2. All clients will solicit services from Expert 1. Expert 1 then follows the continuation equilibrium in Subsection 3.2 for each client. Therefore, in equilibrium Expert 1 will set the same tari¤ (c L + c H )=2, but all clients must …rst subscribe to Expert 1. After Expert 1 has observed a client's signal, he refers the client to Expert 2 if and only if the signal is higher than b s, the equilibrium threshold in (12).
Our construction is similar to a standard Bertrand game with …rms having di¤erent (and constant) marginal production costs: in equilibrium the more e¢ cient …rm sets a price equal to the marginal cost of the less e¢ cient …rm. Expert 1 is more e¢ cient because he invests in information acquisition in the continuation equilibrium. Here, the "more e¢ cient"Expert 1 sets the same tari¤ as the "less e¢ cient" Expert 2, but takes all the surplus from trade. In equilibrium all clients initially seek services from Expert 1, who later refers some to Expert 2. 14
Experts with large cost comparative advantage
We have assumed that the cost comparative advantage parameter is smaller than (c H c L )=2, so for both experts, the service cost in state ! 1 is lower than in state ! 2 . This is our interpretation 14 Clients do know about experts'cost comparative advantage. (In equilibrium, they pick Expert 1 even when both o¤er the same tari¤.) If they do not, their strategies must not depend on experts'identities, so clients pick experts randomly when tari¤s are identical. An equilibrium may then fail to exist when tari¤s can be chosen from a continuous set. The more e¢ cient Expert 1 always undercuts slightly. The usual way to restore existence is to discretize possible tari¤ o¤ers. If the di¤erence between possible tari¤s is su¢ ciently small (like one cent), Expert 1 will just undercut to capture all clients when Expert 2 o¤ers T = (c L + c H )=2.
for the state ! 1 being good and state ! 2 being bad. However, the value of can be larger than (c H c L )=2. In this case, we have c H < c L + . For Expert 2, if the client's state is ! 1 , the service cost becomes higher than if the state is ! 2 . Now, to Expert 2 ! 1 looks like a bad state, while ! 2 looks like a good state (but the opposite is true for Expert 1). This cost speci…cation actually allows equilibrium referrals from each expert to the other.
The derivation of Expert 1's equilibrium strategy, and Expert 2's beliefs remain unchanged, and Proposition 4 in Subsection 3.4 continues to hold. We only wish to note that Expert 2's expected cost of providing service is decreasing in Expert 1's referral threshold, so the expression in (10) is decreasing in b s; in Figure 1 , the dashed line is downward sloping.
For Expert 2, suppose now that he has taken e¤ort e 2 . We construct an equilibrium strategy for Expert 2's referral and e¤ort. Again, in an equilibrium, Expert 1 accepts a referral if the price is below a threshold, say p 2 . Given the tari¤, if Expert 2 uses e¤ort e 2 and receives signal s, he refers if and only if
By MLRP, and c L + > c H , the expected cost in (24) is decreasing in s, so the right-hand side of (24) is increasing in s. By passive belief, in equilibrium, the signal threshold for Expert 2's referral at p 2 is b s 2 such that (24) 
where the various integrals average out those signals below b s 2 across the two states. Given e¤ort e 2 , an equilibrium in referrals exists if there are price p 2 and threshold b s 2 such that
This is the characterization of the referral equilibrium for Expert 2, as Proposition 1 is for Expert 1. Such price p 2 and threshold b s 2 satisfying (25) must exist. Indeed, by MLRP, c L < c H , and c L + > c H , the ratio in the left-hand side of (25) is decreasing in b s 2 , while the ratio in the right-hand side is increasing. 15
For the continuation equilibrium with price p 2 and threshold b s 2 , Expert 2's per-client expected payo¤ from e¤ort e 2 can be simpli…ed to
This has the same interpretation of Expert 1's expected payo¤ in (13). Expert 2's optimal e¤ort is one that maximizes (26), and its …rst-order condition is
Expert 2's equilibrium strategy is therefore characterized by price p 2 , threshold b s 2 , and e¤ort e 2 satisfying (25) and (27).
Using the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 4, we can show that Expert 2's equilibrium e¤ort is never …rst best. Furthermore, given the equilibrium e¤ort e 2 , Expert 2's equilibrium referral threshold b s 2 satis…es f 2 (b s 2 je 2 ) < f 1 (b s 2 je 2 ), so Expert 2 sometimes retains a client even when his expected service cost is higher than Expert 1's. 15 MLRP implies that the distribution f 1 is …rst-order stochastically dominated by f 2 .
Conclusion
We posit a theory about how an organization can overcome market frictions due to hidden action and hidden information. This is a novel approach in the study of credence goods. The extant literature has looked at individual experts operating in a market to serve clients. There has been a lack of focus on how organizations may change experts'incentives. Although an organization can overcome adverse selection by the cost-transfer protocol, this leads to reduced work incentives. We derive a theory of the …rm based on cost of adverse selection in the market compared to cost of reduced work incentive within an organization.
We have made some simplifying assumptions. It may be interesting to study the referral game when clients' bene…ts, not just their costs, are uncertain. Can referral convey information about bene…ts? Can a client rely on an expert to tell him that a service is not worthwhile? Our experts are pro…t maximizers. If one considers the health market as a speci…c application, physicians are known to be altruistic, so the pure pro…t-maximization assumption is invalid. It will be interesting to study how altruistic experts will play the referral game.
In the details of our model, we have also made a number of assumptions. Multiple rounds of information e¤orts are assumed away. Nor are multiple rounds of referral price o¤ers allowed. We have also made use of the constant returns to scale in services. Any of these issues may be relaxed for a more general model.
We have shown that at s su¢ ciently near s, (10) is larger than (9). Therefore, the equation in the lemma must have a solution b s.
Finally, for uniqueness, rewrite the equation in the lemma as
By MLRP, the inverse hazard rates satisfy
see also (28) above. As s changes, the rates of change of the left-hand and right-hand sides of (30) will never be identical. As separate functions, the graphs of (9) and (10) can only cross each other once. In other words, there can only be one solution.
Proof of Proposition 1: The two equations in (12) include the equation in Lemma 3, which already establishes a solution for b s. We then set the value of p 1 according to (12). From Lemma 1, equilibrium referrals are those with signals above a threshold, so we simply set Expert 1's referral threshold at b s. From Lemma 1, Expert 2 accepts a referral if and only if the price is below a threshold, so we set Expert 2's acceptance threshold at p 1 .
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume, to the contrary, that Expert 2 exerts a strictly positive e¤ort e 2 in an equilibrium. By Lemma 1, Expert 2 refers a client if and only if the client's signal is above a threshold, say e s. Let this referral be made at a price p 2 which will be accepted by Expert 1 in equilibrium.
At signal e s, Expert 2's expected cost is (c L + ) Pr(! 1 je s; e 2 ) + (c H ) Pr(! 2 je s; e 2 ) = (c L + )f 1 (e sje 2 ) + (c H )f 2 (e sje 2 ) f 1 (e sje 2 ) + f 2 (e sje 2 ) < (c L + )
Z s e s f 1 (xje 2 )dx + (c H )
We now show that Expert 2's best response is to choose no e¤ort. Given the most pessimistic belief, Expert 1 will reject any referral price p where T Pr(! 1 js; e e)c L Pr(! 2 js; e e)c H < p, so the minimum price for Expert 1 to accept a referral is p = T Pr(! 1 js; e e)c L Pr(! 2 js; e e)c H .
Suppose that Expert 2 takes some e¤ort, say e 2 > 0. Expert 2's expected utility from keeping the client at signal s is T Pr(! 1 js; e 2 )(c L + ) Pr(! 2 js; e 2 )(c H + ). By de…nition, Pr(! 2 js; e 2 ) Pr(! 2 js; e e), so we have Pr(! 1 js; e 2 )(c L + ) + Pr(! 2 js; e 2 )(c H ) Pr(! 1 js; e e)(c L + ) + Pr(! 2 js; e e)(c H ) < Pr(! 1 js; e e)c L + Pr(! 2 js; e e)c H :
Therefore,
T Pr(! 1 js; e 2 )(c L + ) Pr(! 2 js; e 2 )(c H ) > T Pr(! 1 js; e e)c L Pr(! 2 js; e e)c H = p:
Expert 2 cannot pro…t from deviating to an e¤ort and referring some clients to Expert 1.
It remains to show that the triple [e 1 ; b s ; p 1 ] exists. We use a standard …xed-point argument.
Bound Expert 1's feasible e¤orts by a compact convex set, say a closed interval of the real numbers.
Clearly we can let the referral threshold reside in the signal support, which is convex and compact.
Finally, we can also let the referral price be an element of a compact convex set of real numbers.
De…ne a map that takes an e¤ort, a referral threshold, and a price onto themselves: (e 1 ; b s; p 1 ) = (e 0 1 ; b s 0 ; p 0 1 ), where we de…ne by 
Here, (34) is Expert 1's best response against Expert 2's referral-acceptance price p 1 (the same as the maximization of (13) with respect to e¤ort and referral threshold), while (35) is Expert 2's referral-acceptance best response against Expert 1's e¤ort e 1 and referral threshold b s (see also (12) in Proposition 1).
Clearly, the Maximum Theorem applies to (34), and there is a selection of the solution (e 0 1 ; b s 0 ) which is continuous in p 1 . Furthermore, p 0 1 in (35) is obviously continuous in e 1 and b s. By Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, has a …xed point (e 1 ; b s ; p 1 ).
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose not, i.e., suppose that in an equilibrium Expert 1's e¤ort and referral threshold are …rst best. Then f 2 (b s je 1 ) = f 1 (b s je 1 ); see Subsection 2.3. From the second equation in (15) we obtain
We then write (16) as 0:5 c H c L 2 Z s b s @f 2 (xje 1 ) @e 1 @f 1 (xje 1 ) @e 1 dx = 0 (e 1 ):
However, by assumption c H c L > 2 . Comparing this simpli…ed (16) with (5), we conclude that e 1 > e f b. , so Expert 1's e¤ort is not …rst best.
Next, suppose, to the contrary, that f 2 (b s je 1 ) f 1 (b s je 1 ). First, we note that (c L + )f 1 (b s je 1 ) + (c H )f 2 (b s je 1 ) f 1 (b s je 1 ) + f 2 (b s je 1 ) c L f 1 (b s je 1 ) + c H f 2 (b s je 1 ) f 1 (b s je 1 ) + f 2 (b s je 1 ) + [f 1 (b s je 1 ) f 2 (b s je 1 )] f 1 (b s je 1 ) + f 2 (b s je 1 ) :
Therefore, by f 2 (b s je 1 ) f 1 (b s je 1 ), we have c L f 1 (b s je 1 ) + c H f 2 (b s je 1 ) f 1 (b s je 1 ) + f 2 (b s je 1 ) (c L + )f 1 (b s je 1 ) + (c H )f 2 (b s je 1 ) f 1 (b s je 1 ) + f 2 (b s je 1 ) :
Now by MLRP, we have (28):
It follows that which contradicts (15) . We conclude that f 2 (b s je 1 ) > f 1 (b s je 1 ).
Proof of Lemma 4:
The expression in the lemma is obtained from solving for the f 1 =f 2 ratio in (18). Clearly, at = 0, we have f 1 (e s 1 je 1 ) = f 2 (e s 1 je 1 ), so e s 1 is the …rst-best referral threshold at e¤ort e 1 : see f 1 (b s f b je) = f 2 (b s f b je) in Subsection 2.3. The right-hand side of (19) is strictly decreasing in , and goes to 0 as increases to . By MLRP, we conclude that e s 1 must increase to s.
Proof of Lemma 5:
We drop all constants (those that involve only c L and c H ) in (20) Di¤erentiating this with respect to e 1 and setting it to zero, we get the …rst-order condition:
0:5
( Z e s 1 s @f 1 (xje 1 ) @e 1 + @f 2 (xje 1 ) @e 1 dx + Z s e s 1 @f 2 (xje 1 ) @e 1 @f 1 (xje 1 ) @e 1 dx ) = 0 (e 1 ):
Now the …rst-best information e¤ort is given by (5), and we conclude that e 1 is never …rst best except at = 0.
By Lemma 4, e s 1 tends to s as tends to . The …rst integral in (36) becomes arbitrarily small because the integrands are derivatives of densities, which sum to 0 over the support. Obviously, the second integral tends to 0. Hence, any e 1 satisfying (36) must tend to 0.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, at = 0, EC t ( ) in (22) is the expected cost at the …rst best (5). Also, at = , e s 1 = s, e s 2 = s, so EC t ( ) in (22) equals c L + c H 2 . Because EC m ( ) is the market equilibrium expected cost, it is higher than the …rst best. Hence, EC m (0) > EC t (0).
By inspection, we have EC m ( ) < EC t ( ).
Next, because the market equilibrium is independent of , EC m ( ) has a derivative of 1. The expected cost in EC t ( ) is the result of optimal choices of information e¤ort and referral threshold, so the envelope theorem applies. The derivative of EC t ( ) is the partial derivative of (22) with respect to : where the inequality follows from e s 1 < s and e s 2 > s. Hence, as varies between 0 and , there is only point b such that EC m (b ) = EC t (b ). The proposition follows.
